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Organology, the study of musical instruments, has traditionally concentrated on the documentation of instru-
ments: their history, roles in culture, and classification. However, as post-modern, feminist, and post-colonial 
perspectives have questioned some of the assumptions inherent in historiographical, ethnographic, and posi-
tivist endeavours because of their part in reproducing hegemonic ideologies, re-thinking organology and thus 
developing a richer account of musical instruments has become an urgent task. With this regard a queer pe-
rspective in organology, in particular informed by Judith Butler’s theories of “gender trouble,” is crucial in agi-
tating normative beliefs, values, and attitudes that underpin notions of instrumental identity, interaction, and 
meaning. A queer organology becomes especially significant in the critical engagement with musical instru-
ments like those invented by the British composer, performer, and inventor Hugh Davies (1943-2005), and in 
particular his entirely found, amplified, new musical instruments. This is because the challenges to traditional 
instrumental ontologies, the “instrumental trouble” that these instruments pose: reveal the boundaries of con-
ventional organological approaches and methodologies, which are unsuitable in capturing their full signifi-
cance. Deploying Butler’s concepts of recognition, performativity, and subversion in their study can thus repre-
sent an effective strategy in the development of a coherent critique of Davies’s instruments, but also in offering 
an opportunity to further the understanding of the fundamental importance that musical instruments play in 
the articulations of music, as part of what may be called an “instrumental turn.” 
 




An object may immediately be seen as a musical instrument by a member of one 
culture, but not by a member of another.  
– Henry M. Johnson 
 
Musical instruments are arguably the most fundamental constituent elements of music, 
and as such contain the largest potential for reorchestrating the practice of musical 
performance and production, or for ensuring that musicians and audiences do not 
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become an urgent task. With this regard a queer perspective in organology, in particular informed 
by Judith Butler’s theories of “gender trouble,” is crucial in agitating normative beliefs, values, and 
attitudes that underpin notions of instrumental identity, interaction, and meaning such as those ex-
pressed by Michael Praetorius in his 1619 book Syntagma Musicum in which he claimed that “musical 
instruments may be described as the ingenious work of able and earnest artisans who devised them 
after much diligent thought and work, fashioned them out of good materials and designed them in 
the true proportions of art, such that they produce a beautiful accord of sound” (qtd. in Kartomi, 
1990: 135). A queer organology becomes especially significant in the critical engagement with 
musical instruments like those invented by the British composer, performer, and inventor Hugh 
Davies (1943-2005), and in particular his entirely found, amplified, new musical instruments. This is 
because the challenges to traditional instrumental ontologies, the “instrumental trouble” that these 
instruments pose reveal the boundaries of conventional organological approaches and methodolo-
gies, which are unsuitable in capturing their full significance. Deploying Butler’s concepts of recog-
nition, performativity, and subversion in their study can thus represent an effective strategy in the 
development of a coherent critique of Davies’s instruments, but also in offering an opportunity to 
further the understanding of the fundamental importance that musical instruments play in the arti-
culations of music, as part of what may be called an “instrumental turn.” 
 
1. Questioning “the Very Fact” of an Instrument 
In a 1974 publication titled New and Rediscovered Instruments, David Toop (b. 1943) acknowledged 
the existence of a “small, though expanding, group of individuals of widely differing backgrounds 
who are commonly involved in the making of new and rediscovered musical instruments” (1974: 3). 
The book featured work by Toop himself as well as Hugh Davies, Paul Burwell (1949-2007), Max 
Eastley (b. 1944), Evan Parker (b. 1944), and Paul Lytton (b. 1947). Echoing earlier claims by the Italian 
futurist Luigi Russolo (1885-1947) and the French-American composer Edgar Varèse (1883-1965), 
Toop claimed that building new musical instruments was a requirement of the age, a requirement of 
ears that had become accustomed to a new sonic environment, and also a technical requirement of 
new music, for which conventional instruments were no longer suitable (1974: 3). Despite the signi-
ficant activities of this group of individuals, there are no studies that directly and comprehensively 
address their work and in particular the importance of their new musical instruments vis-à-vis 
broader notions of what a musical instrument is and can be. Such a study is necessary not only to 
uncover marginalised histories of instruments that do not conform to a canonical lutherie, but also 
as an opportunity to rethink musical instruments beyond conventional frameworks. 
 
Of particular interest in this regard is the work of Hugh Davies, the composer, performer, artist, and 
researcher whose main activity was arguably the invention of new musical instruments. Indeed, it is 
estimated that Davies built 130 new instruments, sound sculptures, and site-specific installations 
(categories that often overlapped in his work), which he developed over a period of about 40 years 
– from 1966 until his death. In devising his work, Davies did not speak about the Praetorian diligence 
of thought and work, but rather of serendipity, the “faculty of making happy chance finds” (Roberts, 
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1977: 11). The technique of the objet trouvé meant a repositioning of the traditional lutherie artisanal 
craft and skills and included a range of diverse materials and forms in Davies’s instrumentarium. This 
serendipitous process was never more evident than in his “entirely” found instruments, which 
featured little or no physical modification, although they were often electronically amplified. Among 
these were the 3D Postcard, played by running a fingernail across the grooves of a 3D postcard at 
different speeds, and the Lid Clickers, consisting in removable metal lids, which were played by 
scraping, clattering, or spinning them as well as by clicking a button that was placed by manufacturers 
to ensure a product arrived sealed. Several “natural” objects were also part of the entirely found 
instruments, such as the Larchcone Clickers, played by running a finger along the side of a larchcone, 
and the Nut Whistles, played by blowing nuts or acorns that featured a hole bored by insects or 
animals. My Spring Collection featured the spirally coiled steel spring, which was one of Davies’s 
most used sound sources.1 The name My Spring Collection was both a pun referencing fashion jargon 
and a straightforward description of the instrument. Indeed, this instrument, realised in 1975 and 
revised in 1981, counted fifty different loose springs, both extension and compression types of dif-
ferent size and shape, which Davies had serendipitously collected over several years and then housed 
in a box. The instrument could be played in different ways, either with fingers or with a battery of 
objects (which could include all kinds of implement such as thimbles, feathers, fishing nylon, or 
toothbrushes), or it could also be blown. The magnetic pickups that Davies employed to amplify the 
instrument were also found objects. The first he used, around 1969, came from ex-RAF microphones, 
which Davies claimed had been used in Spitfires during the Second World War (1981: 160). Sub-
sequently, when the supply of these diminished, he turned to old telephone handset earpieces or 
headphones used by the military or by telephone operators. The Egg Slicer also used the magnetic 
pickup for amplification. The instrument consisted of the kitchen appliance, which Davies plucked, 
strummed, and variously stimulated (for instance playing it with a feather and blowing on it with a 
straw), revealing rich tonal possibilities. 
 
To fully understand the significance of Davies’s found instruments it is necessary to acknowledge the 
ideas, attitudes, and practices surrounding musical instruments that circulated, were adopted, and 
developed in the twentieth century. Indeed, in the past century there has been considerable activity 
around the reformulation of musical instruments that interests a study of Davies’s work. For instance, 
traditional instruments, such as the piano, have been re-interpreted, as in the case of the prepared 
piano by John Cage (1912-1992) and the Piano Transplant series by Annea Lockwood (b. 1939); new 
instruments have been devised using the then-emergent electronic technology, such as the Ondes 
Martenot and the Theremin among many others; the practice of sound sculpture developed 
considerably, blurring the boundaries between lutherie and fine art practices, for example in the work 
by the Baschet Brothers or Max Eastley; Pierre Schaeffer (1910-1995) theorised a “pseudo-instru-
ment,” a perceptual construct that framed sounds that were heard as originating from a common 
source, while Douglas Kahn spoke about “conceptual instruments,” instruments that are “impossible 
to construct, or whose sound is impossible, or both” (1990: 17). Discussing at length these develop-
 
1 See Palermo, especially chapter 4, for an account of several other instruments based on springs, built by Davies. 
  Settimio Fiorenzo Palermo 
 
20 
ments would be an extremely interesting task, which nonetheless would require greater scope than 
is possible in this article. However, to clarify briefly the ideological underpinnings that motivated 
many of these developments, it is useful to report Harry Partch’s words in Genesis of a New Music 
where, speaking about the promotion of a “youthful vitality in music,” Partch addressed students 
with the following exhortation: 
 
Question the corpus of knowledge, traditions, and usages that give us the piano, 
for example – the very fact of a piano; they must question the tones of its keys, 
question the music on its rack, and, above all, they must question, constantly and 
eternally, what might be called the philosophies behind the device, the philoso-
phies that are really responsible for these things. (1979: xvi) 
 
Partch’s encouragements go further than advocating the establishment of different temperaments; 
indeed, his words resonate with the many challenges to instrumental traditions pursued by twentieth 
century composers, musicians, and artists. However, have organological studies acknowledged such 
work by addressing “the philosophies behind the device”?  
 
In fact, the majority of studies on musical instruments have been concerned more with accounting 
for the “fact” of the instrument, rather than questioning “the corpus of knowledge, traditions, and 
usages” that produce musical instruments. For instance, Nicholas Bessaraboff claimed that orga-
nology aims at covering the “scientific and engineering aspects of musical instruments” (qtd. in Oler, 
1970: 171). Such an aim informed principally the description of the morphology of instruments, their 
acoustic properties, and their taxonomic categorisation, such as for instance in the widely used 
system devised by Erich Moritz von Hornbostel and Curt Sachs based on the mechanism of sound 
production. Margaret Kartomi has argued in particular that these kinds of “Western” typological 
classification system have tended towards ahistoricism and positivism and that the construction of 
increasingly abstract categories risked leading to the interpretation of variations “not as historically 
explainable phenomena but merely as imperfect forms of the underlying ‘essence’” (1990: 29). 
Therefore, Kartomi has identified the need to pay greater attention to how these systems are born 
and function claiming that “classifications are often synopses or terse accounts of a culture’s, 
subculture’s, or individual’s deep-seated ideas about music and instruments, as well as, in some cases, 
philosophical, religious, and social beliefs” (1990: 7). Therefore, in this context questioning the very 
“fact” of an instrument may become an even more resonant and significant task than a musical one. 
 
2. An Instrumental Turn 
Despite the tradition of organological studies Davies believed that, save some exceptions for a Stradi-
varius violin, a Ruckers harpsichord or a Steinway piano, musical instruments had been neglected 
and taken for granted; indeed, he claimed: 
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Depending on the context, the normal focus is either on what is ultimately the only 
really important aspect, the sounding of music in performance, or else on the lives 
of its major composers and, especially in recent years, of its star performers. After 
these come other considerations, such as music’s written-down notation, the accu-
racy of surviving manuscripts and the different versions of a composition, the 
authentic manner of performing earlier music, and so on. Last of all are the sources 
of all sounds, the instruments themselves. (2001: 295)  
 
An “instrumental turn” is thus long overdue in the study of music, and slowly the case for such a turn 
has been gaining momentum. Indeed, Henry Johnson encouraged a broader, more critical under-
standing of musical instruments claiming that “a musical instrument is more than just a sound-
producing instrument” (1995: 266). According to Allen Rhoda “instruments do much more than 
simply vibrate when struck” (2014: 381), while Eliot Bates has called for “thinking through instru-
ments” (2012: 368). Phil Alperson proposed a description that goes beyond the common-sense view 
of musical instruments as “discrete, selfsubsisting material objects, intentionally crafted for the pur-
pose of making music by performing musicians” and concluded that “what counts is that an object 
takes its place in the world of musical practice as something that can be used as a musical instrument” 
(2008: 38). Steve Waksman suggested that musical instruments are polyvalent and polysemic, as they 
are a resource for and a source of music, they are tools and commodities, material objects, visual 
icons, sources of knowledge, and cultural resources (2003: 253). To John Tresch and Emily Dolan, 
thus, it is no longer sufficient to account for the forms and functions of instruments, but there also 
needs to be an examination of the discourses and practices surrounding them (2013: 278). Indeed, 
Samuel Wilson has conceptualised the instrument as constituted by “relationships that make it what 
it is; how it is used, thought about, and heard” (2013: 427), while Kartomi claimed that “instruments 
are not just static objects but are products of human culture and therefore resemble living organisms” 
(1990: 31). Paul Théberge has proposed that the identity of a musical instrument could be more 
productively understood as that of an “assemblage,” a term he redeploys from Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari in order to bring into relief the place of instruments “in a network of relationships… 
with other objects, practices, institutions, and social discourses” (2017: 59).  
 
Ethnomusicologists in particular have attempted to address broader issues concerning musical 
instruments. However, such studies have often considered instruments only as synecdochal for the 
social system, concentrating more on social and cultural convergences rather than investigating their 
critical powers. Sue Carole DeVale, for example, claimed that “a sound instrument is a kind of holo-
gram which can be rotated and viewed from many perspectives and which contains the essence of 
society and culture” (1989: 22). Kevin Dawe has spoken of musical instruments as more than the thing 
in itself:  
 
As sites of meaning construction, musical instruments are embodiments of cultu-
rally based belief and value systems, an artistic and scientific legacy, a part of the 
political economy attuned by, or the outcome of, a range of associated ideas, 
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concepts and practical skills: they are one way in which cultural and social identity 
(a sense of self in relation to others, making sense of one’s place in the order of 
things) is constructed and maintained. (2012: 195) 
 
These claims, though seemingly expanding the significance of musical instruments, also confine them 
to an essentialist conception, as objects endowed with a fixed and static meaning, which is always 
aligned with the status quo; however, are cultural and social identities only constructed and main-
tained, or can they also be challenged and transformed? How can musical instruments be thought 
to participate in and mediate such a struggle? To answer these questions, it is necessary to develop 
an adequate theoretical framework to bring into relief the potential oppositionalities of musical 
instruments.  
 
3. A Queer Organology 
In seeking to account fully for the value of Davies’s entirely found instruments both a conventional 
organology and a discussion of their social history would be unsatisfactory. Indeed, what could a 
“scientific and engineering” study of the Egg Slicer reveal? For instance, it could discuss how different 
brands of slicers had their “strings” tuned to different pitch ranges, or how different strings could 
produce different sounds because the response of the magnetic pickup, which affected the variation 
in the intensity of the amplified sound, depended on the amount of iron the strings contained. 
Similarly, a social history of the Egg Slicer could say how its professional use was not widely spread 
beyond a small circle of musicians and only for a relatively brief period of time. It would clarify that 
Davies was not the first to amplify an Egg Slicer as a “miniature harp:” the British drummer Tony 
Oxley (b. 1938) for example had amplified egg slicers as well as springs and knives since the early 
1970s, although Davies was the first to amplify the instrument with magnetic pickups rather than 
contact microphones, thus obtaining a lower and richer timbre. Although such information would 
certainly be interesting, it would also fall short of being able to develop as substantial an amount of 
material as with more technically complex and more widely used instruments, therefore appearing 
rather secondary in significance. Nonetheless, are sophistication in construction and widespread use 
the only measures to assess the importance of a musical instrument? A queer organology would go 
beyond such clear bias while also addressing much more fundamental questions about musical 
instruments, thus interrogating the “philosophies behind the device.” 
 
Fundamental to the articulation of a queer organology that is adequate in explaining the philoso-
phies behind Davies’s musical instruments is the concept of “instrumentality.” According to Sarah-
Indriyati Hardjowirogo, this concept identifies the “specificity of musical instruments as distinguished 
from other sound-producing devices” (2017: 12). However, Hardjowirogo argues that such an identity 
is “uncertain,” “between the yet-to-be-defined instrument and the assumed other”, thus open to 
cultural negotiation and gradual and dynamic shifts; indeed, for Hardjowirogo culturalisation of 
instrumentality affects the “degree of instrumentality” (indicating how recognisable an object is as a 
musical instrument) without necessarily changing the morphology of the object (2017: 12). In other 
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words, particular cultural circumstances frame and inform our perception of what is a musical instru-
ment. To unpack this concept Hardjowirogo identifies a series of complementary criteria that parti-
cipate in the construction of an instrumental identity. Among these criteria are: intention and pur-
pose; immaterial features and cultural embeddedness; audience perception and liveness. In the 
context of the present study these descriptive and analytical aspects could be further articulated 
within a theoretical framework that is more specifically interpretative and critical.  
 
For this purpose, redeploying Judith Butler’s theories of “gender trouble” in an instrumental context 
could be extremely effective in dealing with the critical discussion of instrumentalities that are sub-
versive. In other words, Butler’s theories are able to perform the intellectual labour necessary to 
rethink and re-evaluate Davies’s musical instruments in terms that directly reject the bias of conven-
tional, hegemonic, and essentialist approaches in traditional organological, musicological, and 
ethnomusicological studies. A queer framework would question (rather than seeking to circumvent 
and therefore leaving them in place) the dominant, Praetorian, “common-sense” ideologies behind 
the concept of the musical instrument, which posit instruments as specialised musical tools, emplo-
ying “fine” materials, and requiring skilled technical labour for their construction, as well as deman-
ding virtuosic dexterity in their use.  
 
According to Butler gender identity is a symbolic construction that creates its own illusion of stability, 
stability that can (and needs) to be challenged on its own terms by dissident forms of gender arti-
culations. For Butler “gender is the mechanism by which notions of masculine and feminine are 
produced and naturalised, but gender might very well be the apparatus by which such terms are 
deconstructed and denaturalised” (2004: 42). Deconstructing and denaturalising gender, creating 
“gender trouble,” has direct consequences for the understanding of sex and sexuality – since gender 
has a complex relationship with anatomy and desire. And especially in relation to the “biological,” 
“material” body, gender, for Butler, comes to define how we construe its facticity, so that such an 
alleged a priori materiality is revealed as always already a cultural construction.  
 
Applying Butler’s theories of gender to the study of musical instruments can open up fruitful inter-
pretative and critical opportunities. Indeed, similarly to gender identity, instrumental identity (or 
instrumentality) can be said to be established by the enforcement of normative characteristics that 
are construed as being “naturally” and intrinsically instrumental, rather than the product of socio-
political-economic processes that have become reified in the particular materiality of an instrument, 
and only through queer formulations of instruments can this ideological matrix be revealed and 
challenged.  
 
To Butler the issues of recognition, performativity, and subversion are fundamental in the context of 
troubling gender. These concepts could also be extremely productive in organising a critical and 
coherent discussion of Davies’s instruments and in particular of his entirely found instruments, which 
present the most powerful case of “instrumental trouble.” The purchase of these concepts is then not  
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only in their capability of generating knowledge on the value of Davies’s instruments, but also, in 
(re)formulating instrumentality, they offer a better understanding of musical instruments more 
broadly. 
 
4. Recognition and Hegemonic Instrumentality 
Butler claimed that “gender . . . figures as a precondition for the production and maintenance of 
legible humanity” (2004: 11). In other words, the experience of acknowledgement of certain natura-
lised and institutionalised gender models is crucial in the constitution of one’s social viability as a 
human being. Therefore, recognition becomes “the site of power by which the human is differentially 
produced” either by conferring or withholding recognition (2004: 2).  
 
There is a clear way in which recognition interests a study of Davies’s musical instruments: in “autho-
ritative” and “institutional” discourses the assessment of their viability and legibility as musical instru-
ments has shaped both their invisibility and visibility. In turn, the differential productions of Davies’s 
instruments also reveal the complexities and discursiveness of the act of recognition, whose modali-
ties present further nuances than a dichotomy between withholding and conferring seems to allow.  
 
To begin with, the existent publications on the history of music have largely ignored Davies’s work 
in building new musical instruments – the omission functioning as a clear judgement on their worth. 
However, such an assessment also transpires from the few cases in which his work has been included, 
but where the information has been scarce. Indeed, in Electronic and Experimental Music there is only 
a passing reference to Davies in which he is called a “hacker of homemade musical instruments” 
(Holmes, 2012: 90), a description that needs further explanation of the terms “hacker” and “home-
made” to achieve greater significance and relevance in accounting for Davies’s work. In Handmade 
Electronic Music there is a brief account of Davies’s work in a section called “Piezo Music,” in which 
Davies is said to have begun “inventing piezo-amplified instruments in the 1970s, the most poetic of 
which consists of a disk with short steel wires soldered around its rim. By plucking or blowing gently 
at these wires, he could elicit a wide range of surprisingly deep, marimba like sounds, which he 
incorporated into composed and improvised work” (Collins, 2009: 41). However, it is not clear which 
instrument is discussed here: each of Davies’s instruments had a specific name, even when this was 
part of a larger family; for instance, the “shozyg” family was a category name Davies gave to his 
amplified instruments, especially those that were housed in unusual containers, such as bread bins 
and accordion files. Each of the shozygs also had a proper name to distinguish them, such as 
Tellybrella and Miniature Radio. Furthermore, the first use that Davies made of a piezo electric pickup 
in a musical instrument was in the 1960s with the invention of the first member of the shozyg family, 
Shozyg I. It may be argued in these cases that there are necessary limitations in what can be included 
in such broad accounts, however the choice of what is given greater or lesser visibility functions as 
an implicit assessment of degree of viability despite the recognition conferred to the instrument. 
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In other cases, the recognition of Davies’s musical instruments has been directly withheld. For 
example in Electronic and Computer Music the only reference to Davies’s creative work regards Gentle 
Fire and Naked Software, two ensembles of which Davies was a member; about Davies’s contribution 
in these contexts it is stated that “his gifts for designing unusual transducers out of materials such as 
scraps of metal and wood, rubber bands, and coils of wire attached to suitable electric pickups such 
as contact microphones, provided them with a wealth of cheap and versatile performance aids” (Man-
ning, 2013: 162). In this text Davies’s musical instruments are differentially produced as “transducers” 
and “aids.” Although this terminology may draw attention to the experimental techniques that 
informed Davies’s processes, which may have resulted in the building of new musical instruments, it 
also has the clear disadvantage of denying his instruments their instrumentality, an identity that was 
clearly asserted by Davies in the discussion of his work (for instance an article Davies authored was 
entitled ‘My invented instruments and improvisations’). Similarly, in a report about the 2011-2013 
exhibition Oramics to Electronica at the Science Museum, UK, the Egg Slicer, which was part of the 
show, was said to provide “amusement” at the thought of it being a musical instrument (Boon et al. 
2014), a claim that while making the instrument visible also suspends the recognition of its instru-
mentality by undermining its seriousness.  
 
In the few studies dedicated exclusively to Davies’s creative work the recognition of his instruments’ 
instrumentality has been conferred directly and clearly (Roberts, David; Palermo, 2015). However, in 
some cases the modality of its conferring has raised some further implications; indeed, there are 
tensions in the “artificial classification” (Kartomi, 1990: 13) established in “The Hugh Davies Collection: 
Live Electronic Music and Self-Built Electro-Acoustic Musical Instruments, 1967–1975” with the 
implication that Davies’s electronically amplified instruments are a subcategory of what is termed 
Davies’s “electronic sound apparatus” (Mooney, 2017), and how this differs from Davies’s own 
“natural” classifications, which consisted in the fluid categories of “concert instruments,” “instruments 
for exhibition,” “found instruments,” and “toy instruments,” or in his grouping instruments in families 
such as the shozyg or springboard families. Also, in the 2016 exhibition Amplified Objects at Access 
Space, Sheffield, UK, which was based on Davies’s work, the term “amplified object” was given much 
greater prominence and importance than “musical instrument.” In this case, the articulation of an 
alternative identity could have appealed to an audience that may have found the term “musical 
instrument” deterring because of its cultural heritage, but it also risked leaving dominant ideologies 
about instrumentality unquestioned, therefore participating in the perpetuation of a binarism be-
tween a natural(ised) instrumentality and its “other.” 
 
It is important to stress that such examples of withholding and conditional conferring of recognition 
may have not been carried out intending to delegitimise Davies’s work, but perhaps precisely be-
cause they may have not been done so they make evident and urgent the necessity to engage in a 
much more robust critique of hegemonic understandings of musical instruments in order to develop 
a more inclusive discussion on instrumentality. This is because the better acknowledgment of its 
diversity would have important consequences in the material dealings of these instruments, as for 
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instance in their preservation. Indeed, their inclusion in museum musical instrument collections 
depend on such understandings as demonstrated by the claim that: 
 
There are a number of definitions as to what constitutes a musical instrument, 
including Berlioz’s “Any sounding body utilised by the composer is a musical 
instrument” (Hector Berlioz, ‘Treatise on Modern Orchestration’ quoted in David 
Cairns’ Berlioz: The Making of an Artist, 1803-1832). However, museum musical 
instrument collections such as those at . . . are generally limited to objects that have 
been created deliberately in order to generate sounds, and, with a few exceptions, 
do not include unmodified “found” sounding objects. (“RE: Hugh Davies”, 2016) 
 
Here, despite the acknowledgement of authoritative (and now historical) formulations of an inclusive 
identity of musical instruments, hegemonic instrumentalities predicated on “common-sense” Praeto-
rian notions of specialization, sophistication, and expertise are re-asserted as what is acceptable. 
What does not conform to such notions is rejected, and in this context the category of the “exception” 
is of particularly significance in its indeterminacy, which perhaps here stands for “primitive” and/or 
“non-Western” instruments.  
 
In this manner, a circle is closed: what is considered to be illegible as a musical instrument is also 
illegitimate in a discussion about the topic, thus resulting in its invisibility. What is invisible doesn't 
have the opportunity to achieve legitimacy and therefore legibility, and so on. It is worth stressing 
that it is the active and ideological withholding of their recognition as legible that marks these 
instruments as illegitimate and thus “un-visible” and “un-viable.” 
 
Nonetheless, even if Davies’s instruments “fail” to conform to the norms of a hegemonic instrumen-
tality, by what notion can they still be said to become musical instruments? How can instrumentality 
be articulated beyond restrictive, sanctioned, and ossified beliefs and assumptions? The concept of 
performativity offers an opportunity to re-theorise instrumentality, opening up further intellectual 
horizons in the understanding of music. 
 
5. Performativity: Doing and Undoing the Instrument 
For Butler, performativity is indissolubly linked to gender; indeed, Butler says that “gender is in no 
way a stable identity or locus of agency from which various acts proceed; rather it is an identity 
tenuously constituted in time – an identity instituted through stylized repetition of acts” (1993: 519, 
italics in the original text). These acts constitute the performative as “the discursive mode by which 
ontological effects are installed” (1996: 112). In other words, for Butler gendered bodies are brought 
into being performatively by the citation of gender norms in a highly regulated and rigid cultural 
context and frame, where some constructions are accepted as authentic and others rejected as 
“copies.” However, because of the discursiveness of such citations, which necessitate constant 
reaffirmation and repetition, these very performative acts also hold a potential for disruption when 
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articulating dissident forms of gendering. Indeed, Butler’s theorisation of performativity in its queer 
“moment” is antiessentialist and antinormative because in that moment the reified and naturalised 
conception of gender is exposed and “undone” by revealing its condition as a “performative accom-
plishment” (1988: 520). The formulation of a conception of performative instrumentality can be as 
productive in the broadening of the understanding of musical instruments. Indeed, when thought of 
as “a specific modality of power as discourse” (1993: 187) performativity renders musical instruments 
not objects with intrinsic characteristics, but “always a doing” (2004: 34); not sanctioned by a singular 
act, but by “repetition and a ritual” (2004: xv). It is this very convergence of acts, gestures, and 
enactments that accomplish instrumentality, which has no essence. From this perspective in Davies’s 
inventions, it is principally their playing that articulates that convergence of acts, gestures, and enact-
ments within the highly regulated and rigid context and frame of a musical performance. It is these 
“citations” that have the power to install (and trouble) an instrumental identity. For instance with the 
Egg Slicer some of these citations included the strumming of the strings as well as of the rectangular 
harp-like frame, which was separated from the holder to add resonance; the gentle squeezing 
together of the longer sides to alter the tension of the strings and therefore their pitch; the turning 
up of the amplification level so that it was possible to blow on the strings in addition to plucking 
them; the placement of the instrument on or above a magnetic pickup to produce different timbres; 
the use of the pickup’s rim to stop the strings for the higher pitches. In this way their instrumentality 
becomes an ontological effect, rather than a cause.  
 
To bring further clarity on the performativity of instrumentality it is important to distinguish such an 
accomplishment from the concept of “instrumentalisation” and that of performance. Indeed, Andy 
Keep used “instrumentalisation” to describe a shift in the context of experimental music, from the 
concept of the musical instrument as a thing to that of an act that “explores an object for its inherent 
sonic properties” (2009: 113). This exploratory process “seeks to discover the performability, intrinsic 
sonic palette and possibilities for sonic manipulation of objects” (2009: 113, italics added). In Keep’s 
formulation there is a clear distinction between the fluidity of instrumentalisation and the concrete-
ness of musical instruments, thus assuming an instrumental identity as a stable, a priori identity rather 
than a discursive effect. Keep expresses this view by saying that musical instruments are predeter-
mined things and that their role is to realise “a language outside or indifferent to its self” (2009: 113). 
On the contrary, the concept of performativity reveals the act of instrumentalisation as constituting 
the illusion of an abiding musical instrument: sonic manipulation interpellates and can trouble the 
musical instrument whether that be the case of a violin or an Egg Slicer – it is only their recognition 
as such that will differently produce their legibility. Instrumentalisation could thus be understood not 
as separate to instrumentality, but rather as part of the culturalisation process discussed by Hardjio-
wirogo. 
 
It is also important to emphasise that the performativity of Davies’s instruments is not to be consi-
dered an uncritical imitation of a musical instrument. Here it is crucial to stress the difference between 
performativity and performance. Butler herself draws a distinction between the two intending “per-
formance” as theatrical representation, because “what is ‘performed’ works to conceal, if not to 
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disavow, what remains opaque, unconscious, unperformable” (1993: 234). Rather, performativity, in 
its queer moment, could be understood as a dissident articulation of the signifying gestures through 
which the musical instrument itself is established. Similarly, Davies’s instruments could be interpreted 
not as naïve and/or normative formulations, but rather as part of a much more critical and subversive 
project.  
 
6. Subversion and Timbre 
For Butler subversion entailed the purposeful “deviation from normalcy” (1993: 176), which enacted 
a denaturalisation strategy and effect. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick spoke of versions of performativity as 
“perversions” or “deformatives,” which “might begin by placing some different kinds of utterance in 
the position of the exemplary” (1993: 3). Indeed, while the performative might (always only tempo-
rarily and ultimately unsuccessfully) perpetuate the normative, it can also disrupt it through displace-
ment, resignification, and parody. To Butler an example of such articulations of subversion is drag 
performance because drag demonstrates how heterosexual constructs can be replicated and resigni-
fied easily and convincingly in non-heterosexual frames, thus bringing into relief the “utterly con-
structed status of the so-called original” (1991: 23). Although there are some directional differences, 
the displacement dynamics are similar in Davies’s instruments. Indeed, in Davies’s lutherie all extant 
objects were available for reinscription as musical instruments, thus establishing a lutherie that 
deviated from the artisanal product. This strategy is reminiscent of the fine art tradition of the “ready-
made” in which, as described in the pages of The Blind Man, an “ordinary article of life” was placed 
so that “its useful significance disappeared” thus creating “a new thought for that object” (“The 
Richard Mutt Case”, 1917: 5). In Davies’s musical instruments ordinary articles of life also underwent 
this process of displacement and resignification. In this way, the Daviesian serendipity was similar to 
the Duchampian “rendezvous,” a chance encounter that occurred when a non-art object, either a 
found object and/or prefabricated material that resulted from “productive” labour, was nominated 
as, or as part of, an art object. John Roberts has spoken of the transformative moment that the 
Duchampian ready-made represented, and how the ready-made, by incorporating productive and 
artistic practice, overcame art’s alienated aestheticism (2007: 2). To Roberts, the readymade also 
brought the artwork “into full alignment with the modes of attention of modern mass production” 
(2007: 39). Indeed, Duchamp’s readymades for Roberts are “congeries of simple labour and complex 
labour, artistic labour and productive labour, alienated labour and non-alienated labour” (2007: 72). 
Such a proximity and exchange of labour, which was made familiar and unfamiliar, “homely and 
unhomely” (2007: 41) to Roberts had a destabilising and subversive effect (2007: 33).  
 
It is important to stress that the subversive power of displacement, resignification, and also parody 
in Davies’s musical instruments is predicated on their enactment within a musical domain. Indeed, 
the radical re-imagining of a musical instrument as the “new thought” for an object or, to use Butler’s 
terminology, the proliferation of the meaning of a musical instrument released from its naturalized 
interiority and surface, can only be engendered in the context of the regulatory frame of a musical 
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endeavour. Nonetheless Björn Heile, commenting on the “museumisation” of the instrumentarium 
used in the piece Der Schall (1968) by Mauricio Kagel (1931-2008) argued that: 
 
There is something distinctly odd about cheap toy instruments being treated like 
valuable artifacts solely on account of their use by a recently canonized composer. 
Indeed, this approach seems to be at odds with Kagel’s iconoclastic intent when he 
combined objects that seemed to come from a trash can and cheap plastic toys 
with valuable instruments to produce his own brand of musical arte povera in the 
first place. (2010: 133) 
 
It may be argued that Kagel was more interested in exploring what could be done with seemingly 
unpromising material than finding a sound that had to be used and that therefore in performance 
the process and the symbolic meaning of working with “worthless” instruments was more important 
than obtaining the exact same sound. Similarly, it could be argued that Davies’s found instruments 
are to be primarily considered as iconoclastic, disobedient gestures rather than to be taken seriously 
in terms of the music they produced. However, the inclusion of objects from a rubbish bin, or of 
cheap plastic toys, springs or an egg slicer, for Davies was part of a specific musical project, and 
although the unorthodoxy of these items was an important aspect, their significance could not be 
reduced to it – indeed their power of subversion lies in the recognition that their provenance did not 
impede their legitimacy as musical instruments. Indeed, the use of found instruments allowed Davies 
to create “new” sounds, sounds richer in timbre than those possible with orchestral instruments. 
Timbre was a crucial concern for Davies, and indeed he believed that achieving a wider range of 
timbres, as well as seeking divergences from tempered tuning and increasing pitch inflection 
possibilities, was the aim of specially constructed and found objects (1992: 504), and of the adherence 
to older technology (1992: 507); with this regard he claimed that: 
 
The instruments of the traditional orchestra have undergone several centuries of 
development and improvement, such as in terms of greater control and flexibility, 
wider pitch range, louder sound capability, greater ability to project the sound in 
larger halls, and better blending with other instruments. But the question never 
seems to be posed: have all these gains been at the expense of anything – such as 
timbre? (1992: 506) 
 
Thus, sound in Davies’s found instruments, although not producing what Praetorius might have 
called a “beautiful accord of sound,” was not an epiphenomenon – rather, concerns about their aural 
possibilities underpinned the serendipitous encounter with the instruments. Discounting the aural 
dimension of Davies's inventions could thus be considered to be another way of denying their 
identity as musical instruments and therefore to neutralise their subversive potential. Therefore, it 
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seems justifiable that the Egg Slicer becomes part of a museum collection,2 because although it is an 
“ordinary article of life” it was not simply chosen for its iconic and symbolic meaning, but also for the 
actual sound it produced, a sound that another egg slicer would not be able to produce, and one 
worth preserving in case a manufacturer discontinued or modified the production of the item, as had 
already happened with egg slicers in Davies’s lifetime.  
 
7. Conclusions 
The study of musical instruments necessitates a paradigm shift in order to account both more broadly 
and more accurately for the possibilities and implications of instrumentality. Such a critical organo-
logy needs to be able to discern and disentangle the complex discourses that are imbricated in 
musical instruments and acknowledge more clearly the fundamental importance that the musical 
instrument plays in the articulations of music. In this way musical instruments can no longer be 
thought of as objects whose facticity can be objectively determined, but rather as the product of the 
intersections of a society’s shifting practices and discourses and as such holding the potential for 
their continuous doing and undoing. In this context Davies’s found instruments, and especially his 
entirely found instruments, are an ideal case study because by challenging normative assumptions 
about musical instruments, they compel the question of what are musical instruments, thus repre-
senting a possibility for their cultural transformation. In challenging the normative requirements of a 
Praetorian, “correct,” hegemonic lutherie predicated on the values of sophistication, preciousness, 
skill, and expertise, Davies’s found instruments become a site of contest for the radical rethinking of 
instrumental identities. Indeed, in a Butlerian interpretation, Davies’s instrumental praxis has the 
effect of denaturalising, re-signifying, and proliferating musical instruments thus leading to the affir-
mation of newly permissible instrumentalities: the category of musical instruments is therefore 
rendered permanently problematic. Being able to account for such instrumental troubles, is thus a 
way to allow for a richer and more diverse account of musical instruments, but also a way to rethink 
them and thus to recognise their potential to transform musical production but also, in turn, parti-
cipate in the broader transformation of philosophical, religious, and social beliefs.  
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